Abstract: The privacy of sensitive events observed by a wireless sensor networks (WSN) needs to be protected. Adversaries with the knowledge of sensor deployment and network protocols can infer the location of a sensed event by monitoring the communication from the sensors even when the messages are encrypted. Encryption provides confidentiality; however, the context of the event can used to breach the privacy of sensed objects. An adversary can track the trajectory of a moving object or determine the location of the occurrence of a critical event to breach its privacy. In this paper, we propose ring signature to obfuscate the spatial information. Firstly, the extended region of location of an event of interest as estimated from a sensor communication is presented. Then, the increase in this region of spatial uncertainty due to the effect of ring signature is determined. We observe that ring signature can effectively enhance the region of location uncertainty of a sensed event. As the event of interest can be situated anywhere in the enhanced region of uncertainty, its privacy against local or global adversary is ensured. Both analytical and simulation results show that induced delay and throughput are insignificant with negligible impact on the performance of a WSN.
Introduction
A typical task [1] of any sensor node is to send time critical data to a centralized authority namely the base station. Data is acquired by a rigid time constraints and spatial significance. The sensor node needs to send this sensitive data to the base station through a secure communication channel. Modification of the data or false data injection into the network can lead to false alarms. Such alarm prompts the sink to take some wrong action. Events can be generated randomly anywhere in the network and nodes can sample their environment at a certain time interval; which means that networks can be either event-driven or time-driven. In event-driven networks, whenever a message is propagated through the network to the sink, message authentication both in terms of data origin and content is imperative. Authentication [2] helps checking whether source information has been tampered or if some node has masqueraded as the source node and sent its own version of the message.
The broadcast [3] by sensor nodes can be monitored by adversaries in the network who can obtain the time of an event from the communication patterns, location of events and nodes from the message flow and see the unencrypted contents of the messages. Using these, adversaries can construct the topology of network, node deployment details and track the spatial-temporal evolution of events. Even if the messages are encrypted, adversaries can learn about the network by recreating the context from the temporal and spatial flow of messages. This compromises the security and privacy of the network and most importantly the sensed object. This compromise may be used in a malicious manner. For example [4] , an animal moving in a forest may be tracked by poachers by breaching both the spatial and temporal privacy of the sensed animal by monitoring the messages in the network. In order to protect the privacy of the sensed object, the spatial information from the messages along with temporal information that yield the time of occurrence of events must be cloaked. Several mechanisms [5] have been proposed to protect the temporal context of the messages. These include introduction of random time delays etc. In this work, we concentrate on mechanism for protection of network's spatial context so that the location of an event's occurrence cannot be learnt from the information available from messages or message flows. For example, in wild life monitoring, a target animal can be tracked by an adversary who is able to associate the time and place of origin of messages with movement behavior of the animal. Thus, breaking the association of message flows from the location is imperative for sustaining the privacy of static or mobile sensed objects. There are two privacy concerns for sensor networks, data-oriented and context-oriented privacy. Data-oriented privacy [6] deals with securing the integrity of data gathered and transmitted to the destination. Context-oriented privacy [7] prevents adversaries form gaining access to data context information, such as, time and location where the data originated. Data oriented privacy focuses on proving protection to data items. Data can be corrupted or eavesdropped by attackers to get critical information or inject false information in the network. A passive adversary eavesdrops [8] communication between nodes to determine the location of nodes or tracks the evolution of events. This kind of unlawful behavior can be mitigated by the use of cryptographic schemes. Active malicious nodes can inject polluted information into the network through these nodes. The main focus of context oriented privacy is to ensure privacy of context related information such as location and time. Location can refer to node location or data origin location. If an adversary can detect the location of sink or the area where event has occurred then it can breach their privacy. It may also track or compromise a sensitive critical target. Ensuring temporal privacy [9] is also critical as time of occurrence can lead to the origin of data. If an attacker gets information of the time of occurrence, it can easily induce important information from the network. For example, in mobile target tracking, an adversary would try to get the time when the target passes through a particular zone to deduce its movement pattern. Securing context-sensitive data can be done through two ways: securing location of sensor nodes and data source and hiding the time of occurrence of event generation. To sustain privacy [10] of the event or the nodes, the data (sensed data or data in messages) and the source of data (event or sensor node) must be protected by blurring the information and decorrelating the data from the location and time of occurrence. In this work, we employ ring signature to preserve the spatial privacy of the sensed object. This is achieved by hiding the identity of the reporting sensor node in the crowd of other nodes to obfuscate the location of the data origin. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the work related to the present study. In Section 3 and Section 4, the system model along with the problem definition is given followed by spatial privacy and proposed scheme in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. Section 7 is devoted to the results and discussion. Section 8 contains the conclusion.
Related work
The problem privacy preservation [11] is addressed to receiver by perturbing the parameters being monitored. The underlying probability distributions are changed so that no definite patterns can be constructed from the perturbed data and the relations between different entities are uncorrelated. Privacy [12] is also achieved by increasing the entropy by enhancing the crowd size or the diversity. This can be achieved by employing cryptographic or non-cryptographic mechanisms. Some non-cryptographic mechanisms [13] have been studied in literature. Random walk [14] has been used in Phantom routing [15] and randomized routing [16] has been used along with flooding to hide the location of the source. Fake message injection [17] and path perturbation algorithms [18] are also used to randomize traffic patterns and reducing the probability of tracking mobile targets. The data is aggregated or their coarseness is increased. Techniques to increase coarseness associated with location details have also been proposed [19] . Cryptographic techniques [20] for privacy complement the non-cryptographic techniques such as routing, virtual ring creation etc. The choice of cryptographic technique is important as they consume resources of the network. This may adversely affect the latency, throughput and network lifetime. There are many approaches to provide privacy of node and data while ensuring efficient resource consumption. In [21] authors have proposed a new time efficient source privacy scheme TESP2 against traffic analysis attack of a global eavesdropper able to monitor and analyze the traffic in the whole network. In TESP2, a sensor node broadcasts request for timed data collection to its upstream nodes. Each upstream node sends the cipher text of the real data else sends the ciphertext of the dummy data if it does not have any real data. In order to preserve the source privacy, the sensor node will discard any dummy data, re-encrypt and forward the ciphertext of the real data to the downstream nodes. In order to mingle real data and dummy data, timed collection data and universal re-encryption techniques based on the topology of the network are used. Energy-efficient data privacy protection scheme [22] ensures privacy and security of the sensed data while maximizing the network lifetime. The energy balancing scheme is based on the distance of the nodes from the sink thus increasing the life time of the network. The privacy of the sensor readings are achieved through a anonymity scheme which is based on hiding the source node identity along the transmission path and only the base station has the ability to verify the sender. Identity based ring signcryption (IBRSC) has been proposed in [23] . The frame work of IBRSC scheme consists of four phase; setup ( ), keygen (ID ), signcrypt ( S R ID A ) and unsigncrypt (σ SA). In the setup phase, with the security parameter , the private key generator (PKG) of the system generates the public parameters π and the master secrete key of the system. The secret key ( ∈ Z * ) and the public parameters of the system is defined as
is the plain text of the message. In the ID generation phase, given the identity I . The public key generator computes the corresponding private key S using the public parameters and the secret key and finally shares it to I through a secure channel. Signcrypt phase is related to the generation of the ring and creates the cipher text. In this phase, a sender having identity I sends and runs the algorithm to send a message to the receiver having identity ID A . The algorithm forms the group of ring members
ID which consists the actual signer I . This outputs the cipher text σ , which is to be communicated. The encrypted message σ is sent to the receiver ID A .
System model
In WSN [2] , sensor nodes are deployed in a region in close proximity of the event to be observed and interact with their physical environment and other nodes. These regions of deployment are usually accessible and sensed objects may be sensitive. The observation of an event of interest and communication of this information makes the sensed object susceptible to physical attacks by compromising its privacy. Thus, spatial and temporal privacy must be central to design of such systems. The revelation of the time of occurrence breaches the temporal privacy while disclosure of location compromises the spatial privacy. For delay tolerant applications [4] , temporal privacy can be preserved by buffering the messages for random time periods on intermediate nodes. An event of interest is delayed intolerantly in the sense that observations of the sensor nodes warrant action immediately in a time limited period and additional delays cannot be introduced in communication paths. The message payload containing observations and other spatial-temporal information is encrypted to guarantee confidentiality. The header is in clear text and contains identity of the origin, routing information etc. The adversary is a protocol and a deployment aware. It has the information of the topology and current communication in the network. An adversary is able to eavesdrop on communication and read the clear text header information and get the identity of the source. However, it is non-intrusive and does not interfere in the functioning of the network. It does not inject or modify messages, compromise sensor nodes or change routing paths. These passive local adversaries may collude themselves over covert channels to obtain global information of the topology and communication and act global as global adversaries. Preservation of spatialtemporal privacy for delay intolerant applications against local and global adversaries raises additional challenges.
Problem definitions
There is a densely deployed WSN in which more than one sensor node observes an event of interest. In this delayed intolerant network, the nodes transmit their observations towards the sink with minimal delay. An adversary can eavesdrop and examine messages from different sensor nodes that report the event to determine the location of the event. The problem is to hide the location information of the reporting nodes such that even an en route adversary that gets messages from multiple sensor nodes is not able to determine the location of the event from the location information of the nodes with sufficient accuracy.
Spatial privacy

System model
We consider sensors (S = {S 1 S 2 S 3 S }) that are deployed where is the population of the deployed sensors. Nodes are assumed to be deployed in uniform random distribution. Prior to deployment, each sensor is assumed to be loaded with a public/private keypair (P S ) for ( = 1 2 3 4 ). Among the public key cryptosystems available, we assume to us ID-based public key cryp-tography. There exist both local adversaries and global adversaries. The local adversary has limited access to the network information and is able to monitor traffic from its one hop neighbours. Unlike the local adversary, the global adversary is able to have information related to the whole network. It has the capability to monitor the whole network and access to local adversary as well. Local adversaries can also collude and give information to the global adversaries.
System evaluation
In WSN, nodes are randomly scattered over a specific area so that every point in the region is within the sensing range of at least one node. The locations of the nodes in this random network followed by a spatial stochastic distribution. This arrangement is usually taken to be a homogenous Poisson point process of density λ and the number of nodes in any set A of lebesgue measure |X | is Poisson with mean (λ|X |). However, when the number of nodes deployed in a region is fixed, Poisson point process is not a good representation of the node distribution. The model may give more nodes than actually present especially when the numbers of nodes are small. When fixed and finite (N) number of nodes are independent and identically distributed in a region, the point process is a binomial point process. When (N) points in a compact set W are distributed independently and uniformly, then the process is a binomial point process. For any subset (X ⊂ W ), the number of points in X is binomial ( ) with parameters ( = N) and ( = |X ∩ W | |W |). The occurrence of event of interest or sensed object which lies in the sensing region of sensor nodes triggers communication from these nodes. A message emanating from a source node report an event is heard by adversaries within the node's communication range. An individual adversary or adversaries can collude to obtain a rough estimation of the location of the sensed object. This estimated zone Z is the anonymity zone. The level of anonymity of a sensed object or event is the inability of the adversary to pinpoint its location in the anonymity zone Z . The degree of anonymity of the sensed event is a function of the location uncertainty of the sensor node reporting the event. This is in turn proportional to the area of the anonymity zone A(Z ). If is the probability that the event occurs at a given point in Z , then = 1. The entropy [25] of the distribution of the anonymity set is
log 2 ( ). The anonymity of a given event is maximized when all points are equally likely to be the potential point of occurrence of the event of interest. Under this uniform distribution, the probability that a point Z under observation is the target ( ∝ To ensure communication connectivity R ≥ 2R , hence, the location of the event must be within a circular region centered at the sensor node with radius R . This is the anonymity zone Z for the event. The event of interest would be located in the union of sensing range of all the sensor nodes in Z . Hence, its privacy is proportional to the number of nodes that are Z . The adversary who has heard the broadcast is sure that at least one node is present in Z . The probability that more nodes are present (where is determined by the level of desired anonymity) can be determined using Bayes' theorem as follows.
2. Source is not known. If the adversary is not able to determine the source of the message, then the anonymity zone Z becomes the union of the sensed region of the possible source nodes and is larger than the first case. For example, the anonymity zone Z for two neighbouring sensor nodes. It can be observed that the size of Z is larger as compared to the first case. Thus, the privacy of an event of interest can be increased by hiding the identity of sensor node reporting the event.
3. Intersection attack. The source does not know the source of a message. However, multiple sensor report events that occur in their vicinity by transmitting packets to the sink over the network. These packets are routed towards the sink by different nodes in the network. As the packets reach near the destination, the routing paths may merge. An adversary sitting at a particular location in the network may receive messages from multiple sources. The possibility becomes higher if the adversary is near the sink. It is also possible that different adversaries communicate with one another over some private channels. The adversaries are aware of location of nodes and the occurrence of an event of interest is reported without any delay. This may allow an intersection attack by an adversary receiving messages on a merged path within a small time interval or by adversaries colluding to exchange such information. The intersection attack reduces the region of uncertainty and allows an adversary to confine the search for the event of interest to a very narrow region.
Case II: The adversary is unaware of the node deployment
A sensor node observes an event and transmits a message to report the event to the sink. The broadcast is received by an adversary who is in the communication range R of the sensor node. The adversary estimates the rough location of the sensor node from the received signal strength. Due to the noise and variation in signal attenuation in wireless channel, the node may lie in an annular region. Since, a node can sense an event in a circular region of radius R around it, the event of interest can be depicted as an annular region. It can be observed that when the adversary is unaware of a node's location, the possibility of pinpointing the location of an event is quite low. If the adversary is not a one hop neighbor of the message source reporting the event, the uncertainty region becomes very large.
Proposed scheme
A WSN is a self-organizing ad hoc network in which sensor nodes communication over the shared medium through broadcast. A node is able to receive the public keys of its neighbours and can employ self-organizing privacy scheme using ring signature [23] . The notion of ring signature signifies anonymous signature generation without the revelation of the original signer. In a ring signature scheme a set of potential signers are assigned. It does not require any coordinator or initiator as compared to group signature [24] . The major difference between these two schemes is that the later requires an entity called group manager which predefines a group of entities and distributes some secret keys to them. Ring signature does not require any such coordinator and rings can be formed autonomously, in a self-organized way. In a typical ring, all the nodes are equipped with a pair of public key and private key. Signer node produces a signature using its own private key, message itself and all the other public keys of other nodes. The formalization of ring signature given in [25] is as follows.
• Ring-Sign ( P 1 P 2 P S ): with the public keys (P 1 P 2 P ) corresponding to ring members, along with secret key S which is the th member (actual signer) produces a ring signature σ for the message . The signer uses a probabilistic algorithm for the signature generation.
• Ring-verify ( σ ): the verifier accepts a message and a signature σ including all the public keys of all the possible signers if it is true else reject it. Ring signature verification is a deterministic algorithm. There are three basic security requirements for ring signature scheme.
• Signer Ambiguity: the probability that a verifier will be unable to determine the real signer of a ring with size , is greater than 1 . Hence the anonymity in the ring signature is limited, and can be computational or unconditional. When the verifier is a participator of the ring and not the actual signer, then it can guess the actual signer with probability not greater than 1 −1 .
• Correctness: when a signer generates a ring signature with any signature scheme correctly, the verifier satisfies the verification equation.
• Enforceability: ring signature poses the strongest definition of enforceability. Any non-ring member trying to forge a ring signature, on behalf of other ring members, where he himself is not part of the message and being successful is negligible. So members who are not part of the signature cannot forge any message. From the property of the ring signature, it can be observed that the size of any ring signature grows linearly with the size of the ring, since the signature has to incorporate the list of ring members.
Privacy of the data. Each node in the network is associated with a pseudonym which is the public key of the nodes working as authenticator as well as identifier. Every node i sensing the event belongs to a ring R which is a collection of finite nodes distributed over the network. Let (R = R 1 R 2 R 3 ) be the set of rings formed in the network. After the occurrence of an event, the evolution of the rings takes place. Let is the information related to a event and (N = N 1 N 2 N 3 N ) be the neighbours where < S, where S as set of nodes deployed in the area. For each node ( ∈ N) generates ring signature σ ( P 1 P 2 P S ), where ( P 1 P 2 P ) are the public key of the nodes and S is the secret key of the node. The other nodes in the network upon receipt of ( σ ) verify the signature. If the received signature at node contains P , then node outputs true and forwards the message else discard it. The signer remains anonymous throughout the network. The sensed object or event is securely transferred to the sink through the nodes which are the part of the evolved rings. Any entity which is not part of the ring cannot gain knowledge about the information in the message. So this scheme fulfills our goal of data privacy.
Privacy of the event.
Data is embedded into a message which is encrypted; also the message is transferred through the formation of ring signature which helps the nodes to preserve its identity. The source of the message is the signer of the ring. The signer sends the message anonymously through the ring formation. Thus the identity of the signer is not revealed. In our assumed scenario, the signer of the ring is the node who senses the event or object. Since the signers are themselves anonymous, the location of the event remains undisclosed to non-ring members. This ensures the contextual privacy in terms of location of the event or object.
Robustness of the proposed scheme
In this section we will be discussing the expediency of our proposed scheme against different attack scenarios. First its effectiveness against local adversaries will be analysed followed by more powerful kind of attackers called global adversaries.
Against local adversaries.
There are few inherent properties of ring signature, whose occurrence in the network may favor adversaries to trace a node and tamper information. Two signatures generated by the same node are not equivalent, since the anonymity set becomes different, so ring signatures are unlikable. Also, the signer S of a ring R is anonymous to an adversary, only if the adversary is unable to detect that is the ring owner. If the public key of is not used by any other ring in the network, in such scenarios an adversary can conclude that is the owner of the ring R with very high probability. This is a probable situation where the node can be compromised by the local adversaries. The probability that the public key P of signer S 1 of the ring will not be used by any other ring is negligible. So a local adversary close to the message source will not gain much information. Nodes form the ring based on the event generated in the network, so there will be redundant paths to the sink from the source. The redundant path may have node such that ( ∈ R ) and ( ∈ R ), where R and R are two different ring anonymity sets. An adversary trying to eavesdrop on the network will be interested in more traffic flow zone. The nodes near the sink will have more traffic. As mentioned earlier, each node in the network will be part of some ring. So near the sink there will be more nodes belonging to more than one anonymity set. Such nodes will be target of an adversary to learn about the information flow in the network. The compromised node in such case may give false positive or false negative response and will send message to the next hop. Since the compromised node will be part of some ring, the downstream nodes in the anonymity set can detect the adversary action.
Against global adversaries. Global adversaries are assumed to have more computational and communication power. It can have more information than the local adversaries about the network, like about the ring formation pattern, location of more traffic flow. It can also make the local adversaries collude. Global adversaries can locate redundant paths, by observing the traffic pattern. We have discussed how node can be compromised by the local adversaries and detection of such compromised nodes.
We assume that global adversaries will be interested to know about the event occurrence in the network. The adversary sitting in a node common to different rings will try to correlate the outputs, thus gaining access to one of the upstream nodes. Global adversaries in this case can make a correlation attack. This can compromise most nodes and tamper the sensed data. But there are multiple paths in the network to report the event to the sink. The probability of compromising all of them is very low. So sink or the other downstream nodes will receive multiple values from different paths. This will make the downstream nodes to conclude that an attack has been occurred in the network and thus the event is also compromised.
Results and discussion
Analytical results
To determine the computational and storage overheads, MPKC based ring signature [28] has been taken as an illustration. The overheads have been calculated using the number of operations and memory requirements in generation and verification of the signature. To determine communication delay the communication system has been modeled as an M/M/1 queue [26, 27] . The delays have 
Computational overhead and storage overhead
The performances of the proposed scheme is compared to existing MPKC schemes [28] such as MI Scheme [28] , PMI scheme [28] and HFE scheme [28] with respect to obtained computation overhead and storage overhead. On an average the proposed scheme, it takes less than 2% of computational overhead compared to with existing MPKC schemes and ECC scheme [28] . For instance, MI scheme takes 58%, PMI scheme takes 74%, HFE scheme takes 10% and ECC scheme takes 100%. Table 1 depicts the percentage of storage overhead by the proposed scheme and the existing MPKC schemes, and the percentage of computation overhead for the proposed scheme is compared with existing MPKC schemes. The storage overhead of proposed scheme is far less than 37% as compared to the existing MPKC schemes and ECC scheme. The HFE scheme takes 69%, PMI scheme takes 74%, MI scheme takes 58% and ECC scheme takes 100%.
Simulation results
Numerous simulations runs have been performed to validate the proposed scheme for resource constrained sensor networks. Results obtained from these simulations are quite promising and shows that our scheme performs quite well under different network scenarios. In Table 2 for different simulations we have changed node density, ring size etc and it has been found that using ring signature to achieve privacy is quite a robust scheme and satisfies the basic needs of scalability, energy consumption in terms of WSN. In this section the validity of this scheme will be shown through simulation results incorporated in graphs.
From Figure 1 , the maximum per node latency is found to be 120 ms. The minimum latency is approximately 6 ms. We note that, the throughput is maximized when the latency is minimized for a node. The application level per node latency and throughput shows the efficacy of the scheme. The cryptographic overhead will consume more power for encryption and decryption process. So, we have analyzed the energy consumed per node and thereby calculated the expected life time of the network under the proposed scheme. The per node latency and throughput for 70 nodes deployed in meter area with ring size 3 for simulation of 7200 s. From the figures, we observe that the maximum throughput of a node is 160 kbps and minimum is found to be 10 kbps.
In Figure 3 , we have plotted the energy consumed by each node for simulation with 70 nodes. From the graph, we see that the maximum energy consumed per node is 6.6 joule whereas minimum energy consumed is 1.5 joule, for the simulation time of 3600 s. The nodes which become part of the ring signature consume more energy compared to other nodes, due to the signature generation and verification overhead. The energy consumed per node increases when the node gets associated with more number of rings. In Figure 4 , expected lifetimes has been shown by varying number of nodes deployed against without using any cryptographic scheme and using ring signature scheme. Computation overhead is an inherent problem with any cryptographic scheme, which works as an impediment for maximum of the schemes. Main challenge with the implementation of any cryptographic scheme is the energy efficiency as lots of energy is consumed for cryptographic key exchange, different digest calculation etc. Our challenge was to see how well ring signature scheme works in terms of energy consumption. We have taken the approach of measuring expected lifetime to show the validity of our scheme in the face of energy consumption. We have assumed a network would be dysfunctional when 10% of the nodes die due to the lack of any other concrete paradigm of network lifetime. We can see that network lifetime with ring signature is quite close to lifetime without any cryptographic overhead. This proves that our proposed scheme can overcome the inherent overhead of cryptographic scheme.Preventing an adversary from learning the precise location of a sensed object or event can be accomplished by increasing the region of uncertainty using cryptographic or non-cryptographic mechanisms. Ring signature allows a sensor node to hide in the crowd of other signers of the ring. Ring signature gives unconditional anonymity to the signing sensor node together with authentication of the signer. This confirms the occurrence of the event of interest. We showed that the signers in the ring signature must be chosen from one hop neighbours of the signing node. The number of signers in the ring needs to be more than three to prevent intersection attacks from global adversaries or adversaries near the sink where different routing paths congregate. The size and computational needs of the ring signature conflict with the resource needs of the sensor nodes and the throughput of the network. Moreover, the signing and verification delay become important in delay intolerant or actuator networks. To determine the efficacy of the proposed scheme, we performed a simulation based study of the WSN. We observed that the computational requirements for generating and verifying the signature are well within the capabilities of nodes. The computation delay and end to end latency due the signature overhead is tolerable when compared to a raw network. Finally, we also found that the optimal number of signers was around three to four to prevent intersection attacks at points where most of the routing paths merge and preserve the privacy of a sensed object.
Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a scheme which ensure both data and context privacy in WSN. In a WSN, an event of interest must lie in the sensing region of a node.
If the location of the sensor node is known, the privacy of the event is breached. To sustain the primary, the location of the sensor node must not be revealed. However, the message must be authenticated to prove the veracity of data. To solve this paradoxical problem of message authentication with node privacy, ring signature is proposed. Ring signature is lightweight signature scheme that gives unconditional anonymity to the signer. In a sensor network, this anonymity threatened by route correlation. It was determined that the scheme is immune to this attack if the number of signers exceeds a threshold. Moreover, the key size of the ring signature results negligible detrimental effect on WSN performance.
